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The traditional view that ￿rms always prefer patents to other forms of protection for their
innovations has been empirically challenged for a long time. It is now well known that trade
secrecy, ￿rst mover advantage and exploitation of lead time may be preferred forms of pro-
tection, at least in some industries. Even in the same industry, forms of protection may
di⁄er according to the nature and importance of the innovation and to the disclosure e⁄ect.
Early studies by Scherer (1965, 1967, 1983) have shown that the propensity to patent varies
signi￿cantly accross industries and that interindustrial variations in patenting activity are
not explained by R&D expenditures. Pakes and Griliches (1980) were among the ￿rst to ￿nd
that the degree of randomness in the patenting activity within industries was not explained by
R&D variations. They have shown that the residual patenting behaviour was explained by the
potential imitation allowed by the disclosed information and by the innovator￿ s capability to
appropriate the rents generated by the innovation. Mans￿eld (1986) obtained similar results
based on a survey where US manufacturing ￿rms were asked what fractions of inventions they
would not have developed in the absence of patents between 1980 and 1983. These fractions
were very low in many industries (less than 10% in electrical equipment, primary metals,
instruments, motor vehicles and others) and relatively high in industries like pharmaceuticals
(60%) and chemicals (40%). Two more recent surveys (Yale Survey by Levin et al., 1987 and
Carnegie Mellon Survey by Cohen et al. 2000) con￿rm these trends: it is only in industries
where knowledge is strongly codi￿ed that patents appear to be substantially preferred to other
forms of protection.
Despite this accumulated empirical evidence, theoretical explanations of why and when
an innovator would prefer to keep an innovation secret rather than to patent it remain rather
scarce. Before turning to the related literature, note that even if patenting is not considered
as the best form of protection, innovators have a lot of reasons to apply for patents serving
purposes di⁄erent from protection (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Encaoua et al. 2004). This
feature complicates the problem. Indeed, a theoretical explanation of why and when patenting
is not the best form of protection must also be compatible with the more cumbersome issue
of why, despite the existence of preferred forms of protection, patents remain so widespread
(Scotchmer, 2004).
At least three types of theoretical arguments are required to explain the protection choice.
First, patents must be recognized as not being ironclad property rights but rather prob-
abilistic rights. If patents o⁄ered perfect protection against any imitation, there would be
no doubt about the best protection regime. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) qualify the uncertain
intellectual property rights in a suggestive way: "A patent does not confer upon its owner the
right to exclude a potential imitator but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent
in court. When a patent holder asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the patent is
2rolling the dice. If the patent is found invalid, the property right will have evaporated". Thus
patent strength refers to the probability to recover damages, with the consequence that only
strong patents give in principle to the patent holder the right to exclude an infringer or to
force him to buy a license. But as we argue below, even holders of weak patents may escape
the uncertain litigation process. They succeed through their licensing strategies to capture a
signi￿cant part of the consumer￿ s surplus. This is why the notion of patent quality enters so
forcefully in the agenda of antitrust authorities nowadays, especially through criticism of the
examination system of the Patent O¢ ce (Merges, 1999, Lemley, 2001).
Second, the traditional view that knowledge is a blueprint has also been challenged. Repli-
cating an existing invention may be costly and time consuming because knowledge is more
or less embedded in individuals and ￿rms rather than in physical products or equipment.
One has to distinguish innovations according to their secrecy e⁄ectiveness, which is the main
determinant of the imitation cost (Anton et al. 2005b). Many innovations involve hidden
know-how even if the allowed performance is perfectly observable. Consider for instance a
process innovation leading to a cost reduction that is re￿ ected back in the market price but for
which the technological knowledge is neither perfectly revealed nor easily reverse-engineered.
In this case, imitating the process innovation or building around it may be rather costly.
Moreover, the imitation cost may depend on whether the invention has been patented or not.
As the patent discloses some enabling technological information, it is clear that imitating a
patented innovation should be at most as costly as if it was kept secret. Our paper o⁄ers a
natural framework to analyze the classical tradeo⁄ between getting a legal protection involv-
ing a compulsory disclosure of enabling information and keeping secrecy by giving up legal
protection.
Third, even if patents do not always appear as the best form of protection, innovators may
nevertheless prefer to patent their innovations because holding a patent o⁄ers the possibility to
settle a dispute against an alleged infringer through a licensing agreement (Farrell and Shapiro,
2005, Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Alleged infringers may also prefer to avoid a litigation
process not only because litigation is costly but also because winning the lawsuit against
the patent holder involves a free-riding aspect, as other competitors bene￿t from the asserted
patent￿ s invalidity. Therefore, even when they are weak, patents generate substantial revenues
through licensing royalties that may harm consumers. This is why patent settlements raise
serious concerns for competition policy authorities (Shapiro, 2003, Encaoua and Hollander,
2004).
The main objective of this paper is to introduce these arguments in a simple model allowing
a discussion of the following issues:
i/ What are the di⁄erent forces that interact in the choice of a protection regime (patent
or secrecy)?
ii/ How are these forces a⁄ected by the patent strength, imitation cost and innovation
3size?
iii/ What sort of licensing agreements are likely to emerge in order to avoid patent litiga-
tion?
Two main contributions have explicitly explored the decision whether to patent an in-
novation or not.1 Hortsman et al. (1985) assume that an innovating ￿rm possesses private
information about pro￿ts available to competitors and that patent coverage may not exclude
pro￿table imitation. Conceived as an information transfer mechanism, a patent that covers
full information is not optimal. The optimal innovator￿ s choice is a mixed strategy between
patenting and keeping secrecy while the follower￿ s optimal choice is to stay out of the market
when the innovator patents and to imitate when the innovator does not. The peculiarities of
this model, in terms of the signaling aspect of the patent and the a priori restrictions put
on the follower￿ s action, explain why imitation of a patented innovation does not occur in
equilibrium. Since our paper is close to Anton and Yao (2004), we describe more thoroughly
their framework. Starting from the premise that disclosure provides competitors with usable
information and focusing on the innovator￿ s decision about how much of an innovation should
be disclosed, their model is particularly relevant for a special type of secrecy e⁄ectiveness.
They describe a situation where the real innovation performance is not directly observable
while the disclosed know-how enables a competitor to costlessly replicate it. Therefore, by
choosing the amount to be disclosed, the innovator directly controls the behaviour of the
potential imitator. Their model is a signalling game where the innovator has private infor-
mation on the innovation size and decides to reveal partially or fully this information, letting
the potential imitator infer the leader￿ s advance. The follower chooses either to imitate or not
under the risk of infringement. A re￿ned perfect bayesian equilibrium of the signalling game
involves a separating strategy in which: i/ small innovations are patented and fully disclosed;
ii/ medium innovations are patented and partially disclosed; iii/ large innovations are kept
secret and partially disclosed through a public announcement. This result is illustrated by
their suggestive title: "little patents and big secrets".
In our model, we maintain the general tradeo⁄ with which an innovator is confronted,
when choosing the protection regime. However, rather than focusing on the signaling aspect
we assume that: i/ the process innovation size, measured by the cost reduction, is directly
observable; ii/ a patent reveals technological information that lowers the imitation cost rela-
tively to the situation where the innovation is kept secret.2 Choosing to patent may expose
1Among other papers related to the choice of an intellectual property regime, one can include Crampes
(1986), Gallini (1992) and Scotchmer and Greene (1990). Crampes examines the tradeo⁄ between keeping
secret an invention during an inde￿nite time or obtaining a legal protection over a ￿nite duration (the statutory
patent life). Gallini introduces the idea that breadth governs the cost of inventing around the patent. However,
it is entry cost rather than imitation cost that matters. Scotchmer and Greene (1990) focuses on the impact
of patent policy on the incentives to innovate. Their model involves a binary choice as the innovation would
not be realized if it were not patented. They also assume full disclosure of technological know-how.
2If the reduction of the imitation cost directly depends on the disclosed level of enabling knowledge, using
4the innovator either to an increased imitation level or to a lower one because the imitation
level does not only depend on the imitation cost but also on two other crucial parameters:
the innovation size and patent strength. It may happen that an innovator bene￿ts from being
imitated : this occurs whenever the incurred loss due to imitation is overcompensated by
the damages it receives from an imitator if the court upholds the patent validity and the
patent infringement. If patenting or keeping secret the process innovation were leading to the
same imitation level, then patenting would be preferred since damages are expected under
the patent regime. This corresponds to the damage e⁄ect. But as soon as imitation levels
di⁄er according to the protection regime, a con￿ ict arises as long as imitation becomes higher
under the patent regime. This corresponds to the competition e⁄ect. Therefore, as soon as
the imitation extent is decided by the follower, di⁄erent interactions may occur between the
competition e⁄ect and the damage e⁄ect. Our paper aims to clarify these interactions. We
propose a complete information multistage game in which three common knowledge parame-
ters are important: the innovation size, the patent strength and the relative cost of imitation.
We depart from the assumption limiting a priori an imitator￿ s behaviour by letting it choose
its own cost reduction in response to the process innovation. We also specify that expected
damages paid by the potential infringer correspond to the infringer￿ s pro￿t, the risk of infringe-
ment being directly linked to the patent strength. Our damages speci￿cation only presents a
slight di⁄erence with the infringer￿ s revenue retained in Anton and Yao (2004).3 Thus our
results may be compared to the "little patents and big secrets" results in Anton and Yao.
The main results of our approach are as follows. For a given innovation size, patent
strength and relative cost of imitation generally act as strategic substitutes. An increase of
one of these parameters must be compensated by a decrease of the other in oder to keep
the same value of the innovator￿ s pro￿t. Inventors of small process innovations always prefer
patent protection to trade secrecy. This reminder of the "little patents" result by Anton and
Yao (2004) rests however on a di⁄erent argument in our model. For large process innovations,
our results present some di⁄erence with the " big secrets" characterization in Anton and Yao.
Our model does not totally discard the possibility of patenting some large process innovations,
whenever imitation is too costly. This may happen when information is poorly disclosed in
the patent. In this case the innovator is indi⁄erent between secret and patent. For medium
process innovations, our results di⁄er more signi￿cantly from those of Anton and Yao. It is not
optimal for a ￿rm producing such an innovation to ￿le a patent of bad quality, that is a patent
a relative imitation cost parameter is equivalent to using a disclosure level. It appears however that working
with the relative imitation cost parameter is more convenient since the extent of imitation remains controlled
by the imitator, while the choice of a protection regime is made by the innovator.
3In a more recent paper, Anton and Yao (2005a) introduce the "lost" pro￿ts of the patentee, de￿ned as the
pro￿ts that would have occured in the absence of infringement. They show that at equilibrium, infringement
may take one of two forms: a "passive" form in which lost pro￿ts of the patentee are zero and an "agressive"
form where they are positive. One of the main results in Anton and Yao (2005a) is that infringement always
occurs when damages equal lost pro￿ts. This last result does not hold in our model.
5having a low probability to be upheld by the court, unless the disclosed information does not
signi￿cantly lower the imitation cost. We show that there exists a safe protection level that
is su¢ cient to deter any imitation and that this level is lower than a 100% protection. As the
innovation size decreases, trade secrecy is less likely. Finally, the "one size ￿ts all" principle
in the patent design is not validated by our analysis.
These results raise many practical issues. While the model predicts that it is seldom
optimal for a ￿rm to ￿le a patent when the probability that it will be upheld by the court is low,
bad quality patents (relatively to novelty and non-obviousness requirements) are widespread
in real word. How can this be explained? Moreover, why bad quality patents are not litigated
more often than we do observe? These issues are at the heart of what has been called the
patent paradox (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Scotchmer, 2004). We devote a brief analysis that
suggests a possible answer to explain this paradox. Whenever a patent is not conceived
only as a protection against imitation but also as a tool to reach private settlements through
licensing agreements (Shapiro, 2003), licensing agreements may act as an alternative to patent
litigation. A royalty rate independent of the patent strength combined to a speci￿c ￿xed fee
may serve this purpose.
The model is presented in section 2. The market competition outcome under the shadow of
infringement is described in section 3. The imitator￿ s behaviour is analyzed in section 4. The
core of the paper, which corresponds to the protection regime choice is examined in section
5. We devote section 6 to licensing agreements. Our conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 The basic set-up
We examine a process innovation in a framework involving two competing ￿rms. We suppose
that ￿rm 1 is an innovating ￿rm and ￿rm 2 is a possible imitator. Each ￿rm is risk-neutral and
seeks to maximize its expected pro￿t. Initially, both ￿rms produce at the same marginal cost
c > 0 . Fixed production costs are assumed equal to zero. We assume that ￿rm 1 undertakes
an R&D investment which allows to reduce the marginal cost to the level d1 < c. The game
we study hereafter starts once the innovation is introduced and involves three stages.
First, in the protection stage, the innovator has to choose between two protection regimes.
The ￿rst regime, which we denote by P, is to patent its innovation, and the second regime,
which we denote by S, consists in protecting its innovation by the means of trade secrecy.
Second, in the imitation stage, after the observation of the innovator￿ s marginal cost d1,
￿rm 2 chooses to imitate (or "build around") the innovator￿ s technology: It imitates the
innovation by transforming its old technology onto a follow-up technology which allows it to
reduce its marginal cost to d2 2 [d1;c]: Note that we do not allow the imitator to improve
the innovator￿ s technology. The di⁄erence c ￿ d2 represents the "extent of imitation". When
d2 = c, there is no imitation at all and when d2 = d1, imitation is full. We assume that
6imitation at a level d2 2 [d1;c[ induces a ￿xed imitation cost I(d2) which depends on whether
the innovation is patented or kept secret. Precisely, we assume that the imitation cost under
the patent regime, which we denote by IP(d2), and the imitation cost under the secrecy
regime, which we denote by IS(d2), satisfy the following condition :
IP(d2) = fIS(d2)
where the parameter f ￿ 0 measures the relative costs of imitation under the regimes P and
S. We assume that f ￿ 1 : since patenting involves a compulsory disclosure, it is likely that
imitating a patented innovation turns out to be less costly than imitating a secret innovation.
Third, in the competition stage, market outcomes are determined under the shadow of
punishment. We assume that, when the innovation is patented, ￿rm 1 sues ￿rm 2 for in-
fringement if ￿rm 2 chooses a follow-up technology that allows to produce at a marginal cost
d2 < c: We also assume that ￿rm 2 systematically contests the validity of the patent covering
the innovation. We denote by e the probability that an imitation infringes the innovator￿ s
patent. This probability can be interpreted as an indicator of the lagging patent￿ s breadth :
the broader the patent￿ s breadth, the higher the probability that a follow-up technology that
reduces the marginal cost c to d2 2 [d1;c[ is an infringement of the patent on the process
innovation d1. We denote by g the probability that the patent survives the imitator￿ s legal
contestation of the patent￿ s validity. We interpret this parameter as the patent￿ s quality : low
quality patents have higher chances to be invalidated by a court than high quality patents.
Thus, a higher quality patent (in terms of novelty and inventiveness) is less uncertain in the
sense that the probability that a court will uphold its validity is higher. Firm 2 is compelled to
pay damages, supposed to be equal to its market pro￿t, if and only if the patent is held valid
and the imitation infringes the patent. This occurs with probability ￿ = eg (we assume that
the issues of validity and infringement are independent). The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] corresponds
to what is called the patent strength. When the innovation is not patented, no damages are
paid.
Following Anton and Yao (2004), we model our duopoly market competition as a tradi-
tional Cournot competition (quantity setting) with linear market demand:
p(x1 + x2) = a ￿ (x1 + x2)
where x1 is the output of ￿rm 1, x2 is the output of ￿rm 2 and p(x1 + x2) is the market
clearing price.
We assume that c < a < 2c: The ￿rst inequality is usual and means that the marginal cost
before innovation is below the choke price. The second inequality expresses that the market
is small which is a likely scenario for innovative markets, as it allows the possibility that the
7innovative ￿rm becomes at least twice as e¢ cient as it currently is4. In other words, the
inequality a < 2c implies that there exist innovations d1 such that d1 < 2c￿a; which can also
be written as a ￿ d1 > 2(a ￿ c):
We choose a convex speci￿cation for the imitation technology and, to reach analytical









The competition stage occurs under the shadow of litigation only if the innovation is patented.
Therefore, the outcome of the competition stage depends on whether the innovation is patented
or not.
3.1 Patented innovation
We separately examine the cases d2 < c (the follower imitates the innovator, at least partially)
and d2 = c (the follower does not imitate the innovator), as the pro￿t functions di⁄er in these
two cases.
The follower imitates (d2 < c) : Under regime P, the expected gross pro￿ts of ￿rm 1
and ￿rm 2 are given by:
￿P
1 (x1;x2;d1;d2;￿) = (a ￿ (x1 + x2) ￿ d1)x1 + ￿(a ￿ (x1 + x2) ￿ d2)x2
and
￿P
2 (x1;x2;d2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ (x1 + x2) ￿ d2)x2
From the expected pro￿ts, one derives the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs xP
1 (d1;d2;￿)
and xP
2 (d1;d2;￿). They correspond either to an interior solution where both ￿rms are active
: xP
1 (d1;d2;￿) ￿ xP
2 (d1;d2;￿) > 0 or to a boundary solution where only ￿rm 1 is active :
xP
1 (d1;d2;￿) > xP
2 (d1;d2;￿) = 0:
Consider ￿rst an interior solution. Routine computations lead to:
xP
1 =




a ￿ 2d2 + d1
3 ￿ ￿
4We acknowledge one of the referees for this suggestion.





Note that this condition is always satis￿ed when d1 > 2c￿a: Note also that the market price
pP(￿) is given by pP(￿) =
a+d2(1￿￿)+d1
3￿￿ which is increasing in ￿ 2 [0;1] as long as condition
(1) is satis￿ed.
Consider now a boundary solution. Such a solution arises when condition (1) is not







The follower does not imitate (d2 = c) : The equilibrium outputs in this case can be
derived from those of the previous case by taking ￿ = 0 and d2 = c: Hence:
- If d1 > 2c ￿ a, then the equilibrium outputs are given by:
xP
1 =




a + d1 ￿ 2c
3







Summing up all these cases, the expected equilibrium gross pro￿ts depend on d1; d2 and
￿ in the following way :


















(3￿￿)2 if d2 < a+d1
2
0 if d2 ￿ a+d1
2
(3)







(3￿￿)2 if d2 < c
(a+c￿2d1)2







(3￿￿)2 if d2 < c
(a+d1￿2c)2
9 if d2 = c
(5)
Therefore, under Cournot competition, ￿rm 2 is driven out of the market if it keeps its
old technology when the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c ￿ a) and remains active on the
market (even without imitating ￿rm 1) when the cost reduction innovation is small enough
(d1 > 2c ￿ a). This result depends on the small market assumption (a < 2c). In a large
market (a > 2c), ￿rm 2 would remain in the market whatever the innovation size. Thus, the
small market assumption captures the strategic aspect in a more complete way.
3.2 Unpatented innovation
Equilibrium outcomes under trade secret regime are derived from those under the patent
regime by taking ￿ = 0. This simply means that no damages are paid when imitation occurs





9 if d2 < a+d1
2
(a￿d1)2







9 if d2 < a+d1
2




Firm 2 aims to maximize its net pro￿t when it chooses its imitation level d2 2 [d1;c]: Since
the follower￿ s gross pro￿t and imitation cost depend on whether the innovation is patented or
not, we have to distinguish these two regimes.
4.1 Patented innovation
Under this regime, the imitator￿ s net pro￿ts when it chooses a follow-up technology allowing
to produce at marginal cost d2 2 [d1;c] is given by :
GP




f (c ￿ d2)
2
10The follower￿ s optimal imitation level when the innovation is patented is determined as:
dP




De￿ne A(￿) = 1￿￿
(3￿￿)2: It is a decreasing function of ￿ 2 [0;1] such that A(0) = 1
9 and
A(1) = 0:
The function d2 ! H(d1;d2;f;￿) = A(￿)(a ￿ 2d2 + d1)2 ￿ 1
2f (c ￿ d2)
2, which is the
expression of GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) when d2 < a+d1
2 and d2 < c, is necessarily either convex or
concave over its whole de￿nition domain. The following preliminary results are easy to show:
1- The function d2 ! H(d1;d2;f;￿) is stricly convex if f < 8A(￿) and is strictly concave
if f > 8A(￿):
2- The unconstrained extremum of d2 ! H(d1;d2;f;￿) is easily obtained by the the FOC:
dint
2 (d1;f;￿) = c +
4A(￿)(d1 ￿ 2c + a)
8A(￿) ￿ f
(8)
In order to obtain the value of dP
2 (d1;f;￿), it is necessary to know whether H(d1;d2;f;￿)
is convex or concave and to compare dint
2 (d1;f;￿) to d1 and c: For instance, when d1 < 2c￿a
and f > 8A(￿) (H strictly concave), equation (8) leads to dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > c: Moreover, as
GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) is a discontinuous function of d2 for d2 = c, it is necessary to compare the value
of GP





4.1.1 Large innovations (d1 < 2c ￿ a)
With large innovations, partial imitation never occurs. The following proposition (proof in
appendix A1) distinguishes two areas in the (￿;f) space according to whether the optimal
imitation level is maximal (dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = d1) or minimal (dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c). In the (￿;f)
space, the extent of these two areas depends on d1:






which is decreasing in the patent strength ￿ and the innovation size c￿d1 such
that :
If f < ￿(d1;￿); then the follower fully imitates: dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = d1.
If f > ￿(d1;￿); then the follower does not imitate dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c and is driven out of the
market.
The interpretation of this proposition, illustarted in ￿gure 1, is clear. When the process
innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c￿a), there exists a threshold imitation cost ￿(d1;￿) such
that if f is below this threshold it is optimal for a follower to fullly imitate the patented
11innovation (dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = d1), whereas if f is above the threshold, it does not pay to imitate.







9 for any d1 < 2c￿a: Therefore, su¢ ciently large patented
innovations, even if they are protected with a weak patent (￿ not far from 0), will not be
imitated as long as the imitation cost parameter f is su¢ ciently high (f > 8
9). This result
means that for a su¢ ciently high lead advance of the innovator and a su¢ ciently high imitation
cost, imitation of the patented innovation never occurs and the technological follower is driven
out of the market. This result, which occurs under a low intensity of competition in the product
market (Cournot) is also true for a higher intensity of competition. 5 Another important result
is that the threshold imitation cost ￿(d1;￿) decreases as the patent is stronger (higher ￿) and
as the innovation is larger (lower d1). The patent strength ￿ and the imitation cost parameter
f act as strategic substitutes, because both f and ￿ include a cost dimension for the imitator,
directly via f and indirectly via ￿: As ￿ increases, the expected damages paid by the infringer
increase and correspond to a higher cost of infringement. Therefore an increase of one of these
cost parameters must be compensated by a decrease of the other in order to keep the same
expected pro￿ts of the imitator.
4.1.2 Small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c ￿ a)
This case is more complicated to analyze. Partial imitation is no more discarded. Indeed, three
situations, namely full imitation, partial imitation and no imitation, may occur according to
the values of the parameters (d1;f;￿). The following proposition (proof in appendix A2)
5It is di⁄erent from the result obtained in Anton and Yao (2005) according to which imitation always occurs
under the lost pro￿t damages
12summarizes the follower￿ s optimal strategy according to the values of the parameters f , ￿
and d1 when d1 > 2c ￿ a.
Proposition 2 Consider small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c ￿ a). For each value of
d1, there exist three separating functions in the (￿;f) space de￿ned by ￿(d1;￿) = 4A(￿)a￿d1
c￿d1,













1￿9A(￿) that delineate three regions:
- If (f;￿;d1) satisfy f < Min(￿(d1;￿);￿ (d1;￿)); then the follower fully imitates: dP
2 (f;￿;d1) =
d1




- If (f;￿;d1) satisfy ￿ (d1;￿) < f < ￿(d1;￿) or f > Max(￿(d1;￿);￿(￿)); then the follower
does not imitate: dP
2 (f;￿;d1) = c.
Functions ￿(d1;￿) and ￿ (d1;￿) are decreasing in the patent strength ￿ and in the innova-
tion size c ￿ d1 and ￿(￿) is decreasing in the patent strength ￿: Moreover the equations in ￿
given by ￿(d1;￿) = ￿ (d1;￿) and ￿(d1;￿) = ￿(￿) have the same solution ￿0(d1) 2 [0;1[ which
means that curves f = ￿(d1;￿), f = ￿ (d1;￿) and f = ￿(￿) meet at a same point ￿0(d1) in
the (￿;f) space for a given d1 > 2c ￿ a:
13This proposition is illustrated in ￿gure 2 in which we assume 2c￿a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5 :It follows
from ￿(d1;0) = 4
9
a￿d1
c￿d1 that ￿(d1;0) < 1 , d1 < 9c￿4a
5 : Therefore it is worth distinguishing
medium innovations
￿
2c ￿ a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5
￿
from small innovations (d1 > 2c ￿ a):
The imitator￿ s choice of d2 is a⁄ected by three variables: the cost parameter f; the patent
strength ￿ and the innovation size c￿d1. De￿ne ￿￿ and ￿￿(d1) as the solutions of the respective
equations: ￿(￿) = 1 and ￿ (d1;￿) = 0. For a given innovation d1 such that d1 > 2c ￿ a, the
e⁄ect of the cost imitation parameter f on the imitation level d2 depends on the value of the
patent strength ￿ in [0;1] in a speci￿c way that we now describe.
When ￿ < ￿￿, the patent is very weak and imitation occurs whatever the cost imitation
parameter f for two reasons. First, the risk of infringing a very weak patent is not su¢ ciently
dissuasive: even if an infringement lawsuit occurs, damages will be paid with a very low
probability ￿. Second, imitation is not expensive enough to deter imitation of a small or
medium innovation (d1 > 2c ￿ a). Therefore, imitation is either partial or full according to
the imitation cost f. It is only partial if f is above the threshold ￿(d1;￿) and it is full if f is
below this threshold.
When ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0(d1); the patent is stronger and imitation becomes more expensive since
the payment of damages occurs with a higher probability ￿. Therefore, imitation may be
either absent, partial or full, according to the imitation cost parameter value f. There is no
imitation at all when f is higher than ￿(￿): Imitation is only partial when f is below ￿ (￿)
and above the previous threhold ￿(d1;￿) and is full when f is lower than ￿(d1;￿).
A third situation occurs when ￿0(d1) < ￿ < ￿￿(d1): In this case, infringing is much more
expensive because the patent will be upheld by the court with a higher probability ￿. However,
keeping the old technology d2 = c is also very detrimental for the follower. Therefore, imitation
is either full or absent according to whether f is below or above the lower threshold ￿ (d1;￿):
Finally, a fourth situation occurs for the highest values of ￿ (￿ > ￿￿(d1)). In this case, it is
no more pro￿table to imitate even when imitation is costless, because the patent protection
is very strong, . The imitation cost does not matter anymore and the presumptions that the
patent will be upheld by the court and that imitation will be judged as being an infringement
are so high that the patent protection entirely plays its role against imitation. Since ￿￿(d1) <
1, it is interesting to note that less than perfect protection is su¢ cient to deter imitation.
Therefore, it is justi￿ed to refer to the value ￿￿(d1) as the safe protection level. A patent
that protects against imitation does not need to be 100% perfect and the safe protection
level depends on the importance of the innovation itself. As the innovation is less important
(d1 increases), the safe protection level ￿￿(d1) increases. This important result suggests that
smaller innovations require stronger protection, since they are likely to be imitated. This is a
serious argument against the "one size ￿ts all" protection principle.
The e⁄ect of d1 over dP
2 (f;￿;d1) for a given (￿;d1) is interesting: as d1 decreases, leading
to an innovation involving a higher cost reduction, the partial imitation area increases be-
14cause ￿(d1;￿) decreases, the full imitation area decreases because both ￿(d1;￿) and ￿ (d1;￿)
decrease and the no-imitation area increases because ￿ (d1;￿) decreases.
4.1.3 Non patented innovation
The follower￿ s optimal imitation strategy under regime S can be simply derived from its
optimal imitation strategy under regime P by taking f = 1 and ￿ = 0. The next proposition
summarizes our ￿ndings when the innovator chooses to use secrecy to protect its innovation.
Proposition 3 Under the secrecy regime, the follower￿ s optimal imitation strategy d1 !
dS
2(d1) is given by:
- If d1 ￿ 2c ￿ a then the follower does not imitate (dS
2(d1) = c) and is driven out of the
market.
- If 2c￿a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5 then the follower partially imitates (dS
2(d1) = 9c￿4(a+d1) < d1).
- If 9c￿4a
5 ￿ d1 ￿ c then the follower fully imitates (dS
2(d1) = d1).
Note that large innovations (d1 ￿ 2c ￿ a ) are never imitated under regime S while they
are fully imitated under regime P when f < ￿(d1;￿):The explanation of this rather unintuitive
result simply derives from the previous remark that ￿(d1;0) < 1 for any d1 ￿ 2c￿a:Then under
the patent regime where some enabling knowledge is disclosed, the cost imitation parameter f
may be so low (more precisely f < ￿(d1;￿) for a patent strength ￿) that it may be pro￿table
to incur the low imitation cost fI(d1) even when damages are paid with a high probability
￿.
5 Protection stage
Which protection regime will the innovator choose, once its process innovation is achieved?
To answer this question, we have to compare its expected pro￿t under the patent regime
￿P
1 (d1;dP
2 (d1;f;￿);￿) to its expected pro￿ts under the secrecy regime ￿S
1(d1;dS
2(d1)), given
its anticipation of the follower￿ s imitation level under each one of the two regimes.
Let us now determine the forces that drive the innovator￿ s protection regime choice. Con-
sider two imitation levels d2;d0
2 2 [d1;c]. The di⁄erence ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) ￿ ￿S
1(d1;d0
2) can be
decomposed in the following way:
￿P















The ￿rst term of this decomposition, namely the di⁄erence ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) ￿ ￿S
1(d1;d2);
corresponds to what we call the damage e⁄ect. Given an imitation level d2, the innovator can
expect some damages if it patents its innovation, which is not the case if it chooses to keep it
secret. Let us show that the damage e⁄ect is always nonnegative and nondecreasing in ￿: This
15is equivalent to show that function ￿ ￿! ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) is nondecreasing for any d2 2 [d1;c].










6￿(a ￿ d2)(d2 ￿ d1) + 6(a ￿ 2d2 + d1) + 2(a ￿ 2d2 + d1)2
3 ￿ ￿





; one can check that this derivative is strictly positive: In particular,
this leads to :
￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) > ￿P
1 (d1;d2;0) = ￿S
1(d1;d2)
When d2 ￿ a+d1
2 , we have shown that ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) does not depend on the parameter
￿: In particular, ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) = ￿P
1 (d1;d2;0) = ￿S
1(d1;d2). It follows that ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) ￿
￿S
1(d1;d2) ￿ 0 for any ￿ 2 [0;1] and d2 2 [d1;c]:
Turn now to the second term. The di⁄erence ￿S
1(d1;d2)￿￿S
1(d1;d0
2) corresponds to what
we call the competition e⁄ect. As the innovator and imitator products are substitute, the
innovator￿ s pro￿ts decline as it is more imitated : ￿S
1(d1;d2) is an increasing function of d2 ,
which implies that the sign of ￿S
1(d1;d2) ￿ ￿S
1(d1;d0
2) is the same as the sign of d2 ￿ d0
2:
Hence, if the innovator anticipates that it will be less (or equally) imitated under the patent
regime than under the secrecy regime then both the damage e⁄ect and the competition e⁄ect
dictate the same protection regime, namely the patent regime. But if the innovator anticipates
that it will be more imitated under the patent regime than under the secrecy regime, then
the damage e⁄ect and the competition e⁄ect are antagonist. The ￿rst pushes the innovator
to choose the patent regime while the second suggests to choose the secrecy regime. The
following lemma, that summarizes and completes what precedes, is useful for the subsequent
analysis:
Lemma 4 If the innovator is less (or equally) imitated under regime P than under regime S
then its optimal protection regime is the patent regime P: In particular, when the innovator
anticipates that it will be fully imitated under the secrecy regime or that it will not be imitated
at all under the patent regime, it always chooses to patent its innovation.
In order to determine the innovator￿ s optimal protection regime, we distinguish the three
cases that appeared in the imitation stage discussion.
Case 1: d1 < 2c ￿ a (large innovations)
In this case, we know that the innovator is not imitated at all when it chooses to keep
secrecy (dS








We have also shown that under the patent regime, the innovator is fully imitated or not
16imitated at all, according to whether f < ￿(d1;￿) or f > ￿(d1;￿): Hence, its expected pro￿t








(3￿￿)2 if f < ￿(d1;￿)
(a￿d1)2
4 if f > ￿(d1;￿)
implying that : ￿P
1 (d1;dP
2 (d1;f;￿)) < ￿S





2(d1)) if f > ￿(d1;￿):
This leads to the following proposition illustrated in ￿gure 3.
Proposition 5 When the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c ￿ a) the innovator prefers to
keep its innovation secret if f < ￿(d1;￿) and is indi⁄erent between patenting and keeping
secrecy if f > ￿(d1;￿).
Hence, keeping secrecy is always an optimal strategy of the innovator when innovation is
large (d1 < 2c ￿ a). Such a choice may hinder di⁄usion of large innovations. This may be
detrimental to society since large innovations are likely to be those which bring breakthroughs
and open big opportunities for technological improvements (cumulative innovation). Proposi-
tion 5 suggests one way to make innovators patent their very inventive innovations: this may
be induced either by reducing the level of compulsory disclosure which is equivalent, in our
model, to increasing the value of the parameter f or by increasing the value of the expected
damages.
Case 2: 2c ￿ a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5 (medium innovations)
17In this case, the innovator is partially imitated under regime S (dS
2(d1) = 9c￿4a￿4d1 < d1)




1(d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1) = (3c ￿ a ￿ 2d1)
2
Three subcases must be distinguished according to the value of dP




Subcase 2.1: f < Min(￿(d1;￿);￿ (d1;￿))
We know that for such a set of parameters, the innovator is fully imitated under regime
P (dP
2 (d1) = d1). Its expected pro￿ts under regime P are :
￿P
1 (d1;dP






Some straightforward calculations lead to:
￿P
1 (d1;d1) > ￿S
1(d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1) () ￿ > ~ ￿(d1) =
9c ￿ 4a ￿ 5d1
3c ￿ a ￿ 2d1
(9)
Hence the innovator chooses to keep its innovation secret if ￿ < ~ ￿(d1) and to patent
it if ￿ > ~ ￿(d1): Note that ~ ￿(d1) is a decreasing function of d1 2
￿





5 ) = 0 and ~ ￿(2c ￿ a) = 1:
It is interesting to compare this new threshold ~ ￿(d1) to the previously de￿ned safe protec-
tion level ￿￿(d1): Since A(￿) is strictly decreasing, the comparison of ￿￿(d1) and ~ ￿(d1) can be
derived from the comparison of A(￿￿(d1)) and A(~ ￿(d1)): From ￿ (d1;￿￿(d1)) = 0 we derive:
A(￿￿(d1)) =
(d1￿2c+a)2
9(a￿d1)2 and, using the above expression of ~ ￿(d1), one obtains: A(~ ￿(d1)) =
3(d1￿2c+a)(3c￿a￿2d1)
(a￿d1)2 : Therefore we just need to compare d1￿2c+a
9 and 3(3c ￿ a ￿ 2d1): For
any d1 2
￿





45 and 3(3c ￿ a ￿ 2d1) > 3(a ￿ c) and so we
get A(￿￿(d1)) < A(~ ￿(d1)) which is equivalent to ~ ￿(d1) < ￿￿(d1):
This result shows that even if a medium innovation is expected to be fully imitated under
the patent regime, a patent protection is still preferred by the innovator if the patent￿ s holder
expects to recover the infringer￿ s pro￿t with a su¢ ciently high probability. What is important
is that this probability ~ ￿(d1) is lower than the safe protection level ￿￿(d1) previously de￿ned.
Therefore, patents will be ￿led even if their protection level is strictly lower than the safe
protection level warranting perfect protection against imitation (see ￿gure 4).
Subcase 2.2 : ￿(d1;￿) < f < ￿(￿)
In this subcase, the innovator is partially imitated under regime P (dP
2 (d1) = dint
2 (d1;f;￿))
and under regime S (dS
2(d1) = 9c ￿ 4(a + d1) < d1). The following lemma (proof in appendix
A3) compares these imitation levels under regime P and regime S.
18Lemma 6 When the innovator is partially imitated under both protection regimes, two cases
arise:
- If f < 9A(￿); then the innovator is more imitated under regime P than under regime S
-If f > 9A(￿); then the innovator is more imitated under regime S than under regime P
Finally, by combining the two previous lemmas, we reach the conclusion that when
f > 9A(￿), the innovator chooses to patent its innovation since the damage e⁄ect and the
competition e⁄ect go in the same direction and dictate the patent regime choice. However, if
f < 9A(￿) the damage e⁄ect and the competition e⁄ect are opposite. The following lemma is
crucial in order to compare ￿P
1 (d1;dP
2 (d1;f;￿);￿) to ￿S
1(d1;dS
2(d1)) in this case.
Lemma 7 Along any curve f = KA(￿) in the (￿;f) space, where K is a strictly positive
parameter, the innovator￿ s pro￿t ￿P
1 (d1;dP
2 (d1;f;￿);￿) increases with patent strength ￿ as
long as partial imitation occurs.
Proof. We showed in appendix A3 that the follower￿ s level of imitation dint
2 (d1;f;￿) depends
on the parameters ￿ and f only through
f
A(￿). This implies that dint
2 (d1;f;￿) remains constant
as one moves on curve f = KA(￿). Then lemma 7 appears as a simple corollary of the result
according to which the function ￿ ￿! ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) is increasing, for given marginal costs d1
and d2; This result appeared when we introduced the damage e⁄ect.
Using this lemma, we derive the following result (proof in appendix A4).
Lemma 8 For medium innovations (2c ￿ a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5 ), when ￿(d1;￿) < f < 9A(￿),
there exists a threshold ￿(d1;￿) decreasing in the patent strength ￿ such that the innovator
keeps its innovation secret if f < ￿(￿;d1) and ￿ < ~ ￿(d1) and patents it if f > ￿(￿;d1) or
￿ > ~ ￿(d1):The threshlod function ￿(d1;￿) satis￿es the following two conditions : ￿(d1;0) = 1
and ￿(d1;~ ￿(d1)) = ￿(d1;~ ￿(d1)):
The ￿rst condition states that the innovator is indi⁄erent between patenting and keeping
secrecy when ￿ = 0 and f = 1 and the second that it is indi⁄erent between these two regimes
when ￿ = ~ ￿(d1) and f = ￿(d1;~ ￿(d1) which is consistent with our previous ￿ndings (see ￿gure
4).
Subcase 2.3: ￿ (d1;￿) < f < ￿(d1;￿) or f > Max(￿(d1;￿);￿(￿))
In this subcase, the innovator is not imitated at all under the patent regime (dP
2 (d1) = d1)
. We derive from lemma 4 that the innovator￿ s optimal protection regime is regime (P).
Finally, the following proposition summarizes the case 2c ￿ a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5 .
Proposition 9 For medium process innovations
￿
2c ￿ a < d1 < 9c￿4a
5
￿
, there exist a thresh-
old function ~ ￿(d1) decreasing in the innovation size c ￿ d1 and a threshold function ￿(d1;￿)
decreasing in the patent strength ￿ such that :
19- If ￿ < ~ ￿(d1) and f < ￿(d1;￿) then the innovator chooses the secrecy regime
- If ￿ > ~ ￿(d1) or f > ￿(d1;￿) then the innovator chooses the patent regime.
This proposition, illustrated in ￿gure 4, can be interpreted as follows. When the patent
is strong enough (￿ > ~ ￿(d1)) the innovator always chooses to patent its innovation whatever
the imitation cost parameter f: This means that the imitation cost allowed by disclosure does
not matter anymore when the patent strength is above ~ ￿(d1). In particular, it patents even if
disclosure makes innovation costless. This result does not hold for weak patents (￿ < ~ ￿(d1)).
In this case, the competition e⁄ect and the damage e⁄ect may go in opposite directions leading
to di⁄erent protection regimes according to whether the disclosure e⁄ect of patenting is high
enough (f < ￿(d1;￿)) or not. The e⁄ect of the innovation size on the secrecy region is clear:
since ~ ￿(d1) decreases as the innovation size decreases (d1 increases), the corresponding area
shrinks as the innovation is smaller.
Case 3: d1 > 9c￿4a
5 (small innovations)
In this case, the innovator will be fully imitated if it chooses regime S (dS
2(d1) = d1).
According to lemma 4, the innovator￿ s optimal protection regime is the patent regime (P).
Proposition 10 Small innovations (d1 > 9c￿4a
5 ) are always patented.
This result can be explained in the following way : since small innovations are fully
imitated under secrecy, patenting is preferred for two reasons : ￿rst, it may deter imitation
20leading to higher market pro￿ts; second, even when the patent strength and the disclosure
e⁄ect are such that imitation cannot be deterred, it allows the innovator to expect some
damages compensating its market pro￿ts loss due to imitation, which is not the case under
secrecy regime.
We develop now an overall discussion of our results by comparing them to those of Anton
and Yao (2004) and by embedding them in a broader perspective.
The last proposition states that inventors of small process innovations always prefer pro-
tection induced by patent to trade secrecy. This result is a reminder of the "little patents"
expression coined by Anton and Yao (2004). However, the argument behind this common
result is di⁄erent in our model. Under the secrecy regime, small process innovations are fully
imitated for two reasons that reinforce one another. First, imitating a small innovation is not
very costly and second, there is no threat of an infringement lawsuit when the innovation is
kept secret. Under patent protection, such a threat exists and it may overrun the bene￿ts
that the infringer expects from imitating the leader. Note that in our model, small innovations
may be imitated under the patent regime while this does not occur in Anton and Yao.
For large process innovations, our results are similar to the " big secrets" characterization
obtained in Anton and Yao. Large process innovations are never imitated when they are kept
secret, while the enabling knowledge disclosed by a patent may reduce the imitation cost in a
way that renders their imitation attractive. This classical tradeo⁄in the economics of patents
explains why "big secrets" are preferred to "big patents". Note however that our model does
not totally discard the possibility of patenting some large process innovations. This may occur
when their imitation under the patent regime is too costly. In this case we have shown that
the innovator is indi⁄erent between secret and patent, because in both cases, the innovation
is not imitated.
Finally, it is for medium process innovations that our results signi￿cantly di⁄er from those
of Anton and Yao. We have shown that keeping an medium process innovation secret does not
avoid imitation. It is precisely for medium process innovations that partial innovation occurs
under the secrecy regime. However, under the patent regime, imitation may be either absent,
partial and total. We have also shown that the innovator may patent or keep secrecy while in
Anton and Yao, medium process innovations are always patented and partially disclosed.
6 Licensing agreement as an alternative to litigation
In this section, we allow licensing agreements between the innovator and the follower. Since
our purpose is not to study all the possible agreements that may emerge, we restrict our
attention to the simple case of process innovations leading to a small cost reduction, i.e.
d1 > 9c￿4a
5 . When introduced in the market, these innovations are fully imitated under
regime S which leads the innovator to patent them. We analyze licensing agreements between
21the innovator and an imitator that avoid litigation to be completed until the court￿ s decision.
We study two-part tari⁄ licences (r;F) where r is a royalty rate and F a ￿xed fee. Let us
￿rst examine the equilibrium outcomes when the innovator and the follower agree on a licence
(r;F): Gross pro￿ts can be written as
￿L
1(x1;x2;d1;r;F) = (a ￿ x1 ￿ x2 ￿ d1)x1 + rx2 + F
￿L
1(x1;x2;d1;r;F) = (a ￿ x1 ￿ x2 ￿ (d1 + r))x2 ￿ F
An equilibrium of competition stage under license regime (L) is given by
xL
1 =




a ￿ d1 ￿ 2r
3
and leads to the following equilibrium price:
pL =
a + 2d1 + r
3
We assume hereafter that 0 ￿ r ￿ a￿d1
2 : This assumption does not entail any loss of generality
since any royalty rate such that r > a￿d1



























First, we adress the following question: does there exist a royalty rate r such that the pro￿ts








Since we do not set any restriction on the ￿xed fee F (in particular, we allow F to be negative),
it is clear that such a question amounts to the existence of a royalty rate r such that the
industry pro￿ts ￿L(d1;r) = ￿L
1(d1;r;F)+￿L
2(d1;r;F) under the licence regime replicate the
industry pro￿ts under the patent regime without licensing, i.e:
￿L(d1;r) = ￿P
1 (d1;￿) + ￿P
2 (d1;￿) (12)
This can be rewritten as:
1
9
[￿r2 + (a ￿ d1)r + 2(a ￿ d1)2] =
2 ￿ ￿
(3 ￿ ￿)
2(a ￿ d1)2 (13)




(a ￿ d1) (14)
The equilibrium price is then given by:
~ pL (￿) =
a + d1(2 ￿ ￿)
3 ￿ ￿
The royalty rate ~ r(￿) and equilibrium price ~ pL (￿) are increasing in ￿: We can now derive
the ￿xed fee ~ F(￿) from equation ￿L






Thus, we obtain the following properties of the function ~ F :
- ~ F(0) = ~ F(1) = 0:
- ~ F(￿) < 0 for any ￿ 2 ]0;1[:










Note that licence (~ r(￿); ~ F(￿)) not only replicates the expected pro￿ts of the innovator and
the follower under regime P (without licensing) but also induces the same equilibrium outputs
and then the same equilibrium price. It is indeed easy to check that :
~ xL
1(￿) =
a ￿ d1 + ~ r(￿)
3
=














which obviously lead to
~ pL (￿) = pP(￿)
where pP(￿) is the equilibrium price under patent regime without licensing.
Thus, the fact that competition stage outcomes are identical under both regimes (patent
under the shadow of infringement and license de￿ned by (~ r(￿); ~ F(￿))), allows us to consider the
licence regime de￿ned by (~ r(￿); ~ F(￿)) as a benchmark to which we will compare the outcomes
of the licensing agreements that are likely to emerge.
6.2 Maximizing the industry pro￿ts
One of the agreements which are more likely to emerge is a two-part tari⁄ license such that
the generated industry pro￿ts is maximum among all the joint pro￿ts realized by two-part
tari⁄ licenses. The part of the industry pro￿ts allocated to each ￿rm is then determined by
the ￿xed fee F.
Consider such a licensing agreement, denoted by
￿
^ r(￿); ^ F(￿)
￿
: Since ^ r(￿) is de￿ned by




, the royalty ^ r(￿) does not depend on the patent strength ￿: More-







^ r(￿) = ^ r =
a ￿ d1
2
= ~ r(1); 8￿ 2 [0;1]
leading to the price:
^ p(￿) = ^ p =
a + d1
2
= ~ pL (1) ￿ ~ pL (￿); 8￿ 2 [0;1]
This result means that the patent strength is no more re￿ ected by the price paid by
consumers. In particular, low quality patents which generate lower prices when litigated,
generate the same maximal price as would do high quality patents. This is the main concern
raised by licensing agreements that harm consumers.
Note that xL
2 = a￿d1￿2r
3 = 0 when r = ^ r: Hence, when the follower accepts licence ￿
^ r; ^ F(￿)
￿
it implicitly accepts to stay out of the market and the industry pro￿ts are then
captured by the patentee. Nevertheless, the innovator transfers a part of these monopoly
pro￿ts to the licensee through the negative ￿xed fee ^ F(￿): In other words, license
￿
^ r; ^ F(￿)
￿
is
equivalent to an agreement where the innovator pays its competitor to stay out of the market.
The pro￿ts of the patentee and the licensee when they agree on license
￿











2(d1;￿) = ￿ ^ F(￿)
This type of agreement is accepted by both the innovator and the follower as long as ￿xed








, that is equivalent to:6
^ F(￿) 2
h
￿A(￿)(5 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ d1)




The possibility that such two-part tari⁄s involving negative fees emerge in licensing agree-
ments is a big concern for competition authorities. We know that in the pharmaceutical
industry, agreements of this kind are allowed under the Hatch-Waxman Act and have been
e⁄ectively used by some patents holders in their negociations with generic challengers. They
obviously harm consumers and this is why patent settlements, which take the form of licensing
agreements, must be under the scrutiny of competition authorities (Shapiro, 2003).
7 Conclusion
Departing from the usual convention that patents are perfect forms of protection opens a lot
of research avenues. One of the most important is to know under what conditions a patent is
preferred to trade secrecy. Our model provides a complete theoretical answer to this question
for a process innovation. For each class of cost reduction (small, medium and large) we
have obtained speci￿c results. First, we have determined the imitation level in each regime.
Second, in the space of the two key parameters (patent strength and relative imitation cost)
we have derived the partition that delineates areas where one protection regime dominates the
other. How can one use these results for a policy purpose? This is an interesting and complex
question for which we propose preliminary insights. Consider the relative imitation cost. In a
world where patent design is independent of the invention, particularly concerning the same
compulsory disclosure for all patents, it seems very hard to determine a priori what would be
the value of the imitation cost parameter. One can simply reach a rather vague idea of the
secrecy e⁄ectiveness of the invention, that leads to an idiosyncratic characterization covering
a large spectrum of possibilities, running from the "naked idea" case to the "perfectly hidden
idea" case. This type of assessment would depend on some priors on whether the the invention
could be more or less easily discovered by reverse-engineering. But in a world where a patent
6The licence (^ r;F0(￿)) where F0(￿) = ￿A(￿)(5 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ d1)
2 is the optimal licence, from the innovator￿ s
perspective, among all the licences that maximize industry pro￿ts. It is likely to emerge if the innovator has a
"take it or leave it" bargaining power. Indeed, it is clear that with such a bargaining power the innovator will
pay its competitor the minimum amount that makes it accept to stay out the market.
25is not designed around the "one size ￿ts all" principle, some ￿ exibility could be introduced by
allowing each innovator to choose a patent inside a menu of characteristics. For instance an
innovator may have to choose between a patent with strong property rights and high disclosure
requirements and a patent with weak property rights and low disclosure requirements. If an
incentive mechanism built around this principle could be achieved, it would be an appropriate
answer to the rather disappointing result according to which "little patents and big secrets"
are the preferred forms of protection. Small innovations could be easily imitated because
their rights are weak. Large innovations could be patented because their rights are strong. In
both cases, di⁄usion of innovation would be enhanced. The construction of such an incentive
mechanism is the next step in our agenda.
Our model analyzes also the licensing agreements between a patent holder and a com-
petitor. Such agreements avoid the litigation to go until completion. One of the possible
consequences of a patent settlement as an alternative to a trial raises some concerns. The
royalty rate paid by the licensee does not depend on the patent strength as a natural bench-
mark would command. Licensing very bad quality patents may occur with as high royalty
rate as if the patent was undoubtful. Moreover, the patentee pays a ￿xed fee to the licensee
to compensate its loss in the market. While the two parties maximize their joint pro￿ts, it is
clear that such a settlement harms consumers and creates a big concern for society. Shapiro
(2003) and Farrell and Shapiro (2005) reach the same conclusion by using quite di⁄erent
models.
Finally, while some economists (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999) ￿nd that probabilistic rights
open welfare improving opportunities (entry occurs under the shadow of punishment) it is
also important to stress some of their negative consequences. Adopting trade secrecy for large
inventions may reduce the di⁄usion of innovation. Moreover, patent settlements of the sort
examined in this paper are detrimental to society. This is one reason why patent quality is
probably one of the most challenging issues to which we are now confronted.
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A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Since ￿P





; it follows from the fact that imitation is







2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = c (16)









In order to determine the maximum value of GP






we must distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : f < 8A(￿)
Function d2 ! GP






2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = H(d1;d2;f;￿)
over this interval. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that dint
2 (d1;f;￿) < a+d1
2 . Then,
there are two possibilities according to whether dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > d1 or dint
2 (d1;f;￿) ￿ d1:
- If dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > d1 then d2 ! GP











, which entails that d2 ! GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿)





at d2 = d1 or d2 = a+d1
2 :
- If dint
2 (d1;f;￿) < d1 then d2 ! GP





which implies that it reaches its maximum value at d2 = c:






: Since we know that
the follower prefers not to imitate rather than imitate at a level d2 = a+d1
2 , it is su¢ cient to
compare GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) to GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) = 0 in order to determine dP
2 (d1;f;￿): Hence, two
subcases arise:






2 (d1;d1;f;￿) > 0 which results in dP







< f < 8A(￿) then GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) < 0 which results in dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c
(no imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(￿)
In this case, dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > c > a+d1
2 and d2 ! GP






. Then, the function d2 ! GP












2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = a+d1
2 : According to (3), this leads
to dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c (no imitation). QED
28A2. Proof of Proposition 2






H(d1;d2;f;￿) , to the net pro￿t it derives from keeping its old technology, ie. GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) =
(d1￿2c￿a)2
9 :Two cases must be distinguished:
Case 1 : f < 8A(￿)
In this case, dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > c and d2 ! GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) is convex over the interval [d1;c[,
which entails that d2 ! GP




2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) which has to be compared to GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) : This
leads us to distinguish two subcases.












- If f < ￿ (d1;￿) then GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) > GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) which results in dP
2 (d1;f;￿) =
d1(full imitation).
- If f > ￿ (d1;￿) then GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) < GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) which results in dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c (no
imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(￿)
In this case, dint
2 (d1;f;￿) < c and d2 ! GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) is concave over the interval [d1;c[.
Two subcases must be distinguished :
- If dint
2 (d1;f;￿) < d1 then d2 ! GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) is decreasing over the interval [d1;c[;
which implies that sup
d22[d1;c[
GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿):
- If dint
2 (d1;f;￿) > d1 then d2 ! GP





2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = GP
2 (d1;dint
2 (d1;f;￿);f;￿):
Consider the condition dint
2 (d1;f;￿) < d1: It is straightforward to show that this inequality
can be rewritten as :




Then, the two previous subcases can be written as:
- If 8A(￿) < f <
4(a￿d1)
c￿d1 A(￿) then sup
d22[d1;c[
GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = GP
2 (d1;d1;f;￿) which has to
be compared to GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) (this has been previously done).
- If f >
4(a￿d1)
c￿d1 A(￿) then sup
d22[d1;c[
GP
2 (d1;d2;f;￿) = GP
2 (d1;dint
2 (d1;f;￿);f;￿) which has to
be compared to GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿): Comparing these two terms is equivalent to compare f to the
threshold ￿(￿) = 8
(3￿￿)2
1￿￿ ￿9
. More precisely :
￿ If
4(a￿d1)
c￿d1 A(￿) < f < ￿(￿) then GP
2 (d1;dint
2 ;f;￿) > GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) which leads to
dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = dint
2 (d1;f;￿) (partial imitation).
29￿ If f > ￿(￿) then GP
2 (d1;dint
2 ;f;￿) < GP
2 (d1;c;f;￿) which leads to dP
2 (d1;f;￿) = c (no
imitation).
Let us now show that the equations ￿(d1;￿) = ￿ (d1;￿) and ￿(d1;￿) = ￿(￿) have the
same solution ￿0(d1) over the interval [0;1[;which means that the curves f = ￿(d1;￿) , f =
￿ (d1;￿) and f = ￿(￿) meet at the same point.
Some straightforward computations show that the equation ￿(d1;￿) = ￿ (d1;￿) is equiva-




d1 ￿ 2c + a
a ￿ d1
Therefore, equations ￿(d1;￿) = ￿ (d1;￿) and ￿(d1;￿) = ￿(￿) have the same solution in ￿ over
the interval [0;1[ if (and only if) 1
9
d1￿2c+a
a￿d1 is a solution of equation
4(a￿d1)
c￿d1 X = 8
X￿9. It is
easy to check that this is satis￿ed. QED
A3. Proof of lemma 6
It is easy to see that dint
2 (d1;f;￿) depends on the parameters (f;￿) only through the
parameter f
(3￿￿)2





A(￿)): It is also clear that the imitation level dint
2 is increasing in
f
A(￿). Hence, lemma





A4. Proof of lemma 8:




1(d1;9c￿4a￿4d1) which expresses that the innovator is indi⁄erent between patenting and
keeping secrecy (in this subcase) has a unique solution in f over the interval [￿(d1;￿);9A(￿)].
Since the function f ￿! dint
2 (d1;f;￿) is strictly increasing over the interval [￿(d1;￿);9A(￿)],
this is equivalent to state that equation ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) = ￿S
1(d1;9c￿4a￿4d1) has a unique solu-






. The last interval can simply
be written as [d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1]:Note that function F￿ : d2 ￿! ￿P
1 (d1;d2;￿) ￿ ￿S
1(d1;9c ￿
4a ￿ 4d1) is a convex parabolic function then it is either i/ increasing over [d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1]
or ii/ U-shaped over [d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1]: Since ￿ < ~ ￿(d1), we have F￿(d1) < 0 (see subcase
2.1). We also know from lemma 4 that F(9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1) ￿ 0. It follows that in both cases
i/ and ii/ equation F￿(d2) = 0 has a unique solution over [d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1]: Hence, equation
￿P
1 (d1;dint
2 (d1;f;￿);￿) = ￿S
1(d1;9c￿4a￿4d1) has a unique solution in f that we denote by
￿(d1;￿): Note that dint
2 (d1;1;0) = dS




2 (d1;f;￿);￿) > ￿S
1(d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1) if and only if f > ￿(d1;￿) (18)
Furthermore, we know that dint
2 (d1;￿(d1;~ ￿(d1));~ ￿(d1)) = d1 and ￿P
1 (d1;d1;￿) = ￿S
1(d1;9c￿
304a￿4d1) (see subcase 2:1) so ￿P
1 (d1;dint
2 (d1;￿(d1;~ ￿(d1));~ ￿(d1));~ ￿(d1)) = ￿S
1(d1;9c￿4a￿4d1)
which leads to ￿(d1;~ ￿(d1)) = ￿(d1;~ ￿(d1)):
Consider now the case ￿ > ~ ￿(d1): Let ￿0 > ~ ￿(d1) and f0 2 ]￿(d1;￿);9A(￿)[: Point (￿0;f0)
belongs to the curve f =
f0
A(￿0)A(￿): It is easy to see (graphically or analytically) that curve
f =
f0
A(￿0)A(￿) necessarily meets either the curve de￿ned by ￿ = ~ ￿(d1) and f ￿ ￿(d1;￿) or the
curve de￿ned by f = ￿(d1;￿) and ￿ ￿ ~ ￿(d1) at a point (￿1;f1) such that ￿1 < ￿0: Since in any
point of the last two curves the innovator￿ s pro￿t under regime P is equal to its pro￿t under
regime S, and ￿1 < ￿0, we derive from lemma 7 that the innovator￿ s pro￿t under regime P is
greater than its pro￿t under regime S when (￿;f) = (￿0;f0): Hence, the innovator chooses
to patent its innovation.
Let us now show that ￿(d1;￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿: Consider ￿1 and ￿2 such that






belong to the curve de￿ned by
f =
￿(d1;￿1)







2 (d1;￿(d1;￿1);￿1);￿1) = ￿S
1(d1;9c ￿ 4a ￿ 4d1) which leads, according to (19), to
￿(d1;￿1)
A(￿1) A(￿2) > ￿(d1;￿2): Furthermore we know that A(￿) is positive and decreasing, so
A(￿2)
A(￿1) < 1: This allows us to state that ￿(d1;￿1) > ￿(d1;￿2): QED.
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